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INTRODUCTION
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,1 Jürgen Habermas
documented the historical emergence and fall of what he called the bourgeois public sphere, which he defined as “[a] sphere of private people
come together as a public . . . to engage [public authorities] in a debate
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but
publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.”2 This
was a space where individuals gathered to discuss with each other, and
sometimes with public officials, matters of shared concern. The aim of
these gatherings was not simply discourse; these gatherings allowed the
bourgeoisie to use their reason to determine the boundaries of public and
private and to self-consciously develop the public sphere. As Habermas
writes, “[t]he medium of this political confrontation was . . . people’s
public use of their reason.”3 The bourgeois public didn’t simply participate, but it did so both directly and critically.
The development of the bourgeois public as a critical, intellectual
public took place in coffeehouses, in salons, and table societies.4 In Great
*
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1.
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., The
MIT Press 1991) (1962).
2.
Id. at 27.
3.
Id.
4.
See id. at 30.
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Britain, Germany, and France, particularly, the coffeehouses and the salons
“were centers of criticism—literary at first, then also political—in which
began to emerge, between aristocratic society and bourgeois intellectuals, a
certain parity of the educated.”5 Intellectual equals came together and deliberated, an equality that was key in ensuring the requisite openness and
deliberation. No one person dominated the discussion due to his status
within the deliberative community. Instead, and above all else, the “power
of the better argument” won out.6
Two conditions were critical to these deliberations. First, equality
was key to the public sphere.7 Membership in the public sphere meant that
no one person was above the other and all arguments were similarly treated
and scrutinized. Second, the principle of universal access was crucial.8 The
doors of the deliberative space were open to all comers and no group or
person was purposefully shut out. Seen together, these two conditions provide a blueprint for deliberative practices in a democratic society.
In the public sphere, reason through speech served as the principal
medium of communication. As Nancy Fraser explains:
[The public sphere] designates a theater in modern societies in
which political participation is enacted through the medium of
talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their
common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive
interaction. This arena is conceptually distinct from the state; it
[is] a site for the production and circulation of discourses that
can in principle be critical of the state.9
Further, according to Michael Warner, “[p]ublic issues were depersonalized so that any person would, in theory, have the ability to offer an opinion about them, submitting that opinion to the impersonal test of public
debate without personal hazard.”10 As such, the bourgeois public sphere
served as a forum where a critically debating public arose. More specifically, this sphere operated as a forum for counter-opinion; its members, as
part of a rational, engaged public, stood in contraposition to the power of
the state. Importantly, it also served as “an institutional mechanism for
‘rationalizing’ political domination by rendering states accountable to
(some of) the citizenry.”11
5.

Id. at 32.

6.

Id. at 54.

7.

Id.

8.

See id. at 85.

9.
Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 2 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
10.
Michael Warner, The Mass Public and the Mass Subject, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE 382 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
11.

Fraser, supra note 9, at 4.
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As we note above, central to Habermas’s account of the rise of the
bourgeois public sphere are the principles of universal inclusion and strict
equality among members. However, the public sphere was much less open
and much less equal than Habermas’s historiography suggests. In this Article, we use the Habermasian account of the public sphere and the
pushback he received from his critics to tell a story of the creation of one
counterpublic, the Michigan Journal of Race and Law.12 Our aim is to reflect
and affirm the central components of the Habermasian project, which we
understand to be the development of a critical, discursive, and public space
that is neither private nor controlled by the state. Thus, like Nancy Fraser,
we will “take as a basic premise . . . that something like Habermas’s idea of
the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and to democratic political practice.”13 As importantly, we will also affirm the critiques
of the Habermasian project. In particular, we will question the normativity
and hegemony of the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere and join with
the critics of the Habermasian account by presenting a justification for the
necessity and creation of counterpublics. We will also argue that something
like the idea of a counterpublic sphere is indispensable to social theory and
democratic political practice.
Part I of this Article provides a short overview of Habermas’s account
and a summary of the criticism of his account. Part II tells the story of law
reviews as hegemonic public spheres. Part III reflects on the creation of the
Michigan Journal of Race and Law (MJRL) using the frame of the public
sphere and the counterpublic sphere. The central aim of this Part is to
present MJRL as intentionally created and conceived as a counterpublic in
opposition to the normalized and hegemonic public sphere, which in the
context of this Article is the general interest law review.
I. THE PUBLIC SPHERE

AND THE

COUNTERPUBLIC

According to Habermas, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, relatively well-off individuals gathered together, as private
individuals, to discuss matters of mutual and public concern.14 The “emergence of this new public space, which effectively formed a zone of mediation between the state and the private individual, shaped and was shaped
by the emergence of a philosophical concept and consciousness of ‘publics’
and their importance.”15 Public in this sense is a “loose . . . forum in
12.
We do not purport here to tell the story of the creation of the Michigan Journal of Race
and Law. We only purport to tell a subjective story, from our vantage point and from our recollection. Others will certainly have differing accounts, which may differ in critical or trivial respects. We welcome those as well as corrections of our account where objective facts
demonstrate otherwise.
13.
Fraser, supra note 9, at 3.
14.
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 23, 127, 172-73.
15.
John Michael Roberts & Nick Crossley, Introduction, in AFTER HABERMAS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 2 (Nick Crossley & John Michael Roberts eds., 2004).
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which the private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion.”16 More specifically, Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries came together to deliberate and address issues of general interest.17 The bourgeois publics studied by Habermas were deliberating “over
the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.”18 The deliberation of the bourgeois public was the formation of “public opinion” that
Habermas defines as “the tasks of criticism and control which a public
body of citizens informally—and in periodic elections, formally as well—
practices vis-à-vis the ruling structure organized in the form of a state.”19
Habermas notes two preconditions for the bourgeois public sphere.
First, the public sphere must be open and accessible to all.20 Habermas
explains that the “public sphere of civil society stood . . . with the principle of universal access. A public sphere from which specific groups would
be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public
sphere at all.”21 Second, in the public sphere everyone has an equal voice
with influence determined by the force of reason.22 Participants in the
public sphere were not to be distinguished on the basis of their station in
life but on the strength of their ideas. Habermas writes that the “bourgeois
public’s critical public debate took place in principle without regard to all
preexisting social and political rank and in accord with universal rules.”23
Included in these universal rules was the requirement that public deliberation proceeded “in accord with reason.”24 Public opinion was tied to the
idea that the “better argument” would win out.25
16.

HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 25-26.

17.

See id. at 25-27.

18.

Id. at 27.

Jürgen Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964), 3 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 49, 49 (1974).
19.

20.

HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 85.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 54.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.
It is worth quoting Habermas in full: “These rules, because they remained strictly
external to the individuals as such, secured space for the development of these individuals’ interiority by literary means. These rules, because universally valid, secured a space for the individuated person; because they were objective, they secured a space for what was most subjective;
because they were abstract, for what was most concrete. At the same time, the results that under
these conditions issued from the public process of critical debate lay claim to being in accord
with reason; intrinsic to the idea of a public opinion born of the power of the better argument
was the claim to that morally pretentious rationality that strove to discover what was at once just
and right.” Id.
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However, the public sphere was much less open and much less equal
than Habermas’s historiography suggests.26 For example, Fraser remarks
that “the official public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number of significant exclusions.”27 Under a single public
sphere, subordinated groups had no space they could call their own, a forum where they could deliberate amongst themselves about their particular
needs.28 Membership in these publics is reflective of social pressures and
political hierarchies, thus relegating the principle of universality to mere
aspiration, not actual practice. In direct response, Fraser argues that “members of subordinated groups – women, workers, people of color, and gays
and lesbians – have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternate
publics.”29 She labels these new publics “subaltern counterpublics.”30 These
settings play a crucial role vis-à-vis the bourgeois public sphere. They
were, as Fraser explains, “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, so as to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and
needs.”31
Scholars have produced a great deal of evidence for support of this
larger critique. Perhaps the most striking example is the late-twentieth
century U.S. feminist subaltern counterpublic, with its varied array of
journals, bookstores, publishing companies, film and video distribution
networks, lecture series, research centers, academic programs, conferences,
conventions, festivals, and local meeting places.32 The examples extend
much earlier than this, of course. From the time that the leading publics
began to engage in their critical projects, counterpublics arose alongside
them as spaces where those excluded could engage in similar practices.
The example of women is particularly appropriate, in light of the view that
“the bourgeois public sphere is essentially, not just contingently, masculinist.”33 Women were explicitly shut out of the public sphere, but this fact
did not prove to be the end of their public engagements. Instead of ac26.

See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 9, at 5.

27.

Id.

28.
Id. at 14 (“[M]embers of subordinated groups have no arenas for deliberation among
themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies.”).
29.
Id.; see also MARY P. RYAN, WOMEN IN PUBLIC: BETWEEN BANNERS AND BALLOTS,
1825-1880 (1990); Mary P. Ryan, Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in Nineteenth Century
America, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 10, at 283-84 (explaining that
democratic public spaces proliferated and their occupants ranged from working men and immigrants to Blacks and women, all of whom “fought their way into the public from a distinctive
position in civil society, usually a place of political marginality and social injustice.”).
30.

Fraser, supra note 9, at 14.

31.

Id.

32.

Roberts & Crossley, supra note 15.

JOAN B. LANDES, WOMEN
REVOLUTION 7 (1988).
33.

AND THE

PUBLIC SPHERE

IN THE

AGE

OF THE

FRENCH
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cepting defeat, they “found circuitous routes to public influence.”34 In the
late 1800s, they held public meetings, petitioned state legislatures directly,
and appeared at city council meetings, and also lobbied legislatures and
public officials, and “even opened an office in Washington to monitor developments in the nation’s capital.”35 These routes were explicitly political,
concerned with affecting public policy through established institutions.
But this was not all. Their engagements were also channeled through more
unstructured fora, such as “outdoor assemblages, in open, urban spaces,
along the avenues, on street corners, and in public squares.”36 Even the
home felt the influence of these subaltern movements, thus blurring the
traditional line between public and private.37
Race offers a second major example.38 In general, Michael Dawson
explains that a Black Public Sphere is “a set of institutions, communication
networks, and practices which facilitate debate of causes and remedies to
the current combination of political setbacks and economic devastation
facing major segments of the Black community and the creation of oppositional formations and sites.”39 Dawson locates these publics as far back as
antebellum America and “as recently as the early 1970’s.”40 These
counterpublics arose in a number of diverse settings. For example:
an active counterpublic was continued through organizations
such as the Negro Women’s Club Movement, the journals,
meetings and activities of the fledgling civil rights organizations, the small but active literary cycles among Black women
and men, the activities and debates of Black academics and
through the Black church. The blossoming of Black organizational forms in political, economic and social arenas combined
with the Harlem renaissance both strengthened the Black
counterpublic and increased pressure for African American inclusion in official discourses and oppositional publics.41
34.

Ryan, Gender and Public Access, supra note 29, at 284.

35.

Id. at 281.

36.

Id. at 264.

37.
Id. at 272 (“American women, especially of the urban middle classes, worked just as
franticly to infuse the home with social functions, giving new definition to the border between
public and private life.”).
38.
A third major example, that of class, is also deserving of note. See Geoff Eley, Nations,
Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century, in HABERMAS AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 10, at 319-25.
39.
Michael C. Dawson, A Black Counterpublic?: Economic Earthquakes, Racial Agenda(s),
and Black Politics, in THE BLACK PUBLIC SPHERE: A PUBLIC CULTURE BOOK 201 (Black Public
Sphere Collective eds., 1995).
40.

Id. at 201, 210.

41.

Id. at 204.
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In this way, the Black public sphere may be closely linked to its feminist counterparts. Its genesis is also similarly explained, and rather obvious:
“[T]he formal expulsion of African Americans at the end of the nineteenth century from official spheres of public discourse and decision-making and the informal exclusion of African Americans from the mainstream
of most oppositional movements, led to a dual strategy that was followed
by African Americans until the 1960’s.”42 Interestingly, gender differences
also proved too strong and influential in the Black Public Sphere, enough
so as to generate the creation of a distinctly Black feminist sphere with its
own organizations, literatures, and the like.43
These counterpublics share at least two major unifying characteristics. First, they follow the same general formula: exclusion leads to the
creation of alternative deliberative spaces for critical engagement. To reiterate, during antebellum America, the fact that women were “excluded,
silenced, or shouted down in the public, democratic, and male-dominated
space” led them to “carve[ ] out another space in which to invest psychic,
social, and political energies.”44 The reality of exclusion led to the necessity of a public deliberative space. Second, these subaltern counterpublics
were stigmatized by the dominant publics, deemed inferior and unnecessary. The women-friendly salon culture, for example, was stigmatized by
the republicans as “effeminate,” “artificial,” and “aristocratic.”45 Despite
their hegemonic status, the leading publics were threatened by the mere
existence of counterpublics.
Habermas’ second precondition, the principle of equal voice, also
falls short. The general argument is simple: individuals gained admission to
these publics on the basis of private reason, a resource readily available to
all. In other words, one is accorded membership to these publics on the
strength of one’s ability to reason, to exercise one’s critical capabilities with
others. On this reading, membership in these publics is thus grounded on
the equality principle, on the fact that all members are possessors of the
ability to reason. This idea of reasoned exchange leads to further benefits.
When discoursing with others, for example, “[w]hat you say will carry
force not because of who you are but despite of who you are.”46 As
Michael Warner explains, “Implicit in this principle is a utopian universal42.

Id.

43.
See id. at 215; Kimberlé Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law
and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 404-25 (David Kairys ed., 3d
ed. 1998).
44.

Ryan, Gender and Public Access, supra note 29, at 273.

45.

Fraser, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting JOAN LANDES, WOMEN AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
AGE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1988)). Fraser went on to remark that “masculinist
gender constructs were built into the very conception of the republican public sphere, as was a
logic that led, at the height of Jacobin rule, to the formal exclusion from political life of
women.” Id.

IN THE

46.

Warner, supra note 10, at 382.
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ity that would allow people to transcend the given realities of their bodies
and their status.”47 We are equal qua members of the public. As such, it is
our voices, our ideas, not our selves, which press on and carry the argument. It is most important not who we are, but what we say. Epistemic
authority is a function of ideas and not status.
A leading objection argues that “the ability to abstract oneself in public discussion has always been an unequally available resource.”48 In order
for the larger claim to work, Warner argues that “[i]ndividuals have to
have specific rhetorics of disincorporation; they are not simply rendered
bodiless by exercising reason.” Yet, he continues, “it is only possible to
operate a discourse based on the claim to self-abstracting disinterestedness
in a culture where such unmarked self-abstraction is a different resource.”49 Warner’s conclusion follows earlier claims about unequal access.
Despite the public sphere’s claim to universality, that is, “[t]he subject
who could master this rhetoric in the bourgeois public sphere was implicitly – even explicitly – white, male, literate, and propertied.”50 In other
words, and notwithstanding its claim to equality and universality, “the
bourgeois public sphere continued to rely on features of certain bodies.
Access to the public came in the whiteness and maleness that were then
denied as forms of positivity.”51 This reliance was no mere coincidence, he
argues; in fact, “[t]he bourgeois public sphere has been structured from
the outset by a logic of abstraction that provides a privilege for unmarked
identities: the male, the white, the middle class, the normal.”52 To put this
point differently, the fact that the larger argument turns to and depends on
ready-made concepts such as reason, law, and nature serves not to universalize the public sphere but to narrow it. This is because reason, law, and
nature are not concepts that are available to all. Rather, they are reserved
for those deemed ideologically and politically superior. Not all men, on
this reading, are considered equal.53
Once we understand the public sphere as a forum of privilege, two
further arguments come into fuller view. First, as Nancy Fraser explains:
[Habermas’] narrative . . . like the bourgeois conception itself,
is informed by an underlying evaluative assumption, namely,
that the institutional confinement of a public life to a single,
47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 383.

53.
See LANDES, supra note 33, at 11 (“[T]he central categories of bourgeois thought –
universal reason, law, and nature – are embedded in an ideologically sanctioned order of gender
differences and public-private spheres which grounds the institutional and cultural geography of
the new public sphere.”).

FALL 2015]

Creation of a Racial Counterpublic

9

overarching public sphere is a positive and desirable state of affairs, whereas the proliferation of a multiplicity of publics represents a departure from, rather than an advance toward,
democracy.54
The single, leading public sphere stands alone as the legitimate public
sphere, as the sign of reasoned exchange of ideas. In contrast, counterpublics are signs of the other, the deviant, the outsider. This point is particularly relevant in the context of law reviews and the recent explosion of new
journals.
Second, and from the perspective of what we call the counter-participants, these new counterpublics played a crucial role in expanding the
“discursive space” for those unable to penetrate the leading public
sphere.55 Moreover, in stratified societies—societies “whose basic institutional framework generates unequal social groups in structural relations of
domination and subordination”56—participatory parity is but an ideal, unworkable in practice. As we take into account the reality of counterpublics,
however, the level of abstraction is immediately generalized, from the individual to the group. In so doing, the question is no longer whether individuals participate, for they do, in more than one public. More
importantly, and from the perspective of the individual, this is a desirable
circumstance, for the society will be one “with many different publics,
including at least one public in which participants can deliberate as peers
across lines of difference about policy that concerns them all.”57
This second point is crucial to our larger story. The general response
to Habermas’s leading story is one of skepticism about his single public
hypothesis. More importantly, the crucial point is not the mere existence
of various counterpublics but the fact that a diversity of publics directly
increases one’s participatory chances, especially in a society as diverse as
our own. Fraser writes: “In general, we can conclude that the idea of an
egalitarian, multicultural society makes sense only if we suppose a plurality
of public arenas in which groups with diverse values and rhetorics participate. By definition, such a society must contain a multiplicity of publics.”58
On this reading, counter publics are necessary institutions if the claim of
participatory equality is to be taken seriously.

54.

Fraser, supra note 9, at 13.

55.
Id. at 15 (“[I]nsofar as these counterpublics emerge in response to exclusions within
dominant publics, they help expand discursive space. In principle, assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will now have to be publicly argued out. In general, the proliferation of subaltern counterpublics means a widening of discursive contestation . . . .”).
56.

Id. at 13.

57.

Id. at 18.

58.

Id. at 17.
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HABERMASIAN PUBLICS

The previous discussion bears an uncanny resemblance to a longstanding debate within the legal academy that has recently spilled onto
larger media outlets. This is the debate over the role of law reviews, institutions with much history and tradition on their side. Most law schools
have one “flagship” law review, the place where drafts of prospective articles flow and scholarly reputations are subsequently made. This is an odd
institution.59 It is odd because it places law students in charge of editorial
decisions and in so doing puts the careers of young law professors in the
hands of what may charitably be described as amateurs.60 This Part examines the history and evolution of these law reviews. Part II.A discusses their
genesis and raison d’être. Part II.B examines the shift in the purpose of
these institutions, away from a strictly pedagogical focus and towards a focus on legal scholarship. As the law reviews shift in focus and become
exclusive clubs, the analogy to the Habermasian public sphere comes into
sharp relief. In response, Part II.C documents the rise of the legal
counterpublics. We situate this history within the creation of the Michigan
Journal of Race and Law.
A. History
The institution of the law review dates back to the 19th Century, a
time when treatises and law reports were the leading forms of legal scholarship.61 The earliest record of these institutions is the American Law Journal
59.
See Gerhard Casper, Foreword, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 405 (1983) (“[O]ne of the
most startling characteristics of American legal scholarship is the fact that so much of it is published in student-edited periodicals.”).
60.
See Michael Bacchus, Strung Out: Legal Citation, the Bluebook, and the Anxiety of Authority, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 273 (2002) (“Decisions made by law students, then, have a
considerable effect on the careers of law professors. In some ways, amateurs function as the
gatekeepers to professional advancement . . . .”); Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/lawscholarships-lackluster-reviews.html (“Law reviews are not really meant to be read. They mostly
exist as a way for law schools to evaluate law professors for promotion and tenure, based partly on
what they have to say and partly on their success in placing articles in prestigious law reviews.”).
61.
Legal treatises, or systematic analyses of single substantive branches of law, date as far
back as Sir Thomas Littleton’s Treatise on Tenures, published in 1481. See A.W.B. Simpson, The
Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 632, 634 (1981). Leading treatises include Coke’s various Institutes, Hale’s Analysis of the
Law, and Blackstone’s Commentaries. See Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical
Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739,
743-44 (1985). They were the leading, if not the only, form of legal scholarship up until the
early 1800s. See id. at 742-45. Between 1826 and 1830, James Kent’s influential Commentaries on
American Law were published. Id. at 745. In 1834, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws was available to the public. Id. at 746.
In contrast with the treatise, the law report contained court decisions, case summaries,
and legal commentaries. The earliest account of these reports – the Year Books – dates back to the
reign of Edward I. See W. Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English Law (1925). The first case
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and Miscellaneous Repertory, a magazine of sorts that operated from 1808 to
1817.62 Similar magazines sought to establish a niche for their own brand
of legal doctrine and were aimed at the legal practitioner. For example,
The Carolina Law Repository was founded in 1813,63 the New York Judicial
Repository in 1818,64 The Journal of Jurisprudence in 1821,65 the United States
Law Journal and Civilian’s Magazine in 1822.66 These magazines had brief
life spans, from as short as six months to as long as five years. In 1829, the
first magazine to closely resemble our modern journals—The United States
Law Intelligencer and Review—was founded.67 It resembled law reviews by
including “lead articles” among its various features.68 It lasted two years.69
By 1850, one could count ten surviving magazines from among the
ranks.70 The numbers began to rise, if only slightly at first. In 1852 and
1866, the American Law Register and the American Law Review were established, respectively.71 In 1870, professional journals, such as the Albany
Law Journal, entered the scene, and the Central Law Journal was established
in 1874.72 Subsequent years witnessed a flurry of activity. During the period between 1870 and 1886, the number of legal periodicals rose from
seventeen to forty-two.
This period also saw early attempts to establish student-edited journals.
A precursor of the student-led reviews—the American Law Register—began
publication in 1852.73 While this journal is now called the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, the Department of Law at the University of
reports – the Kirby Reports – appeared in the United States in 1789. Swygert & Bruce, supra, at
749. A second report appeared in 1790. Id. at 749-50. In the following years, these published
case reports multiplied dramatically so that 473 volumes could be counted by 1836. Id. at 750.
Their popularity did not diminish for decades. See id. As a result, by the 1870s and 1880s the
West Publishing Company established the system we enjoy today. See Erwin C. Surrency, Law
Reports in the United States, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48, 62 (1981).
62.
Richard A. Danner, More than Decisions: Reviews of American Law Reports in the PreWest Era, DUKE LAW SCHOOL REPOSITORY 3 (2015), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=6172&context=faculty_scholarship.
63.

Id. at 24.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 24 n.171.

67.

Id. at 26.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Swygert and Bruce, supra note 61, at 754.

71.

Danner, supra note 62, at 31.

72.

Id. at 39.

73.
See A HISTORY
Goebel Jr. ed., 1955).

OF THE

SCHOOL

OF

LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 430 n.97 (Julius
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Pennsylvania did not assume its reigns until 1896.74 In 1875-76, the Albany
Law School Journal was published but did not move past its first volume.75
It would be a decade until another student group would attempt to
establish a law journal. The event took place on February 3, 1885, when
the Columbia College Law School witnessed the birth of Volume I, Number 1, of the Columbia Jurist, “an octavo of four pages that was to be ‘published weekly by the students of the Columbia College Law School.’ ”76
The Jurist originated within the student ranks, its publication modeled on
those of various other departments within Columbia College.77 Early on,
the Jurist published each week’s moot court cases, class notes, as well as
“notes of important cases recently adjudicated and leading articles by ‘persons’ of acknowledged merit, in and out of the College.”78 The publication of these articles distinguishes the Jurist as the forerunner to our
modern law reviews. Interestingly, the Jurist is also the forerunner in selecting its students by way of competitive essays submitted to a committee.79 After passing hands a number of times, the Columbia Jurist folded on
January 1887.
The demand for a student publication did not wane within the campus of Columbia College, however, and so the following fall a monthly
publication—the Columbia Law Times—entered the scene.80 This publication, unlike the Jurist, published book reviews and was edited with much
greater care.81 In most other respects, the Times closely resembled its predecessor. For example, it published leading articles as well as dictated lectures notes. Further, students contributed original work, and the
succeeding editorial board was chosen on the basis of this written work.82
Around this same time—1887, to be specific—the Harvard Law Review was founded.83 Its mission was simple. In its own words: “The REVIEW is not intended to enter into competition with established law
journals, which are managed by lawyers of experience, and have already a
firm footing with the profession.”84 Instead:
Our object, primarily, is to set forth the work done in the
school with which we are connected, to furnish news of inter74.
Id.
75.
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Id. at 102.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
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est to those who have studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if
possible, to all who are interested in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is done under the Harvard system of
instruction. Yet we are not without hopes that the REVIEW
may be serviceable to the profession at large.85
The Harvard Law Review was thus spurred by two primary goals: to keep
alumni abreast of developments at the law school and to spread the virtues
of the Langdellian system of legal education to the world.86 Above all, the
Review wished to be of help to the legal profession.
The Yale Law Journal followed four years later.87 After its first year, its
chairman declared: “Enough has been done to justify the belief that [the
Yale Law Journal] will widen the scope of the school; a strong and growing
band of contributors have come to support it; many articles of permanent
interest and value have been published.”88 In his view, the Journal had
been “well started[,] on its way toward the future . . . with reasonable
success, and with the warm encouragement of the graduates of the
school.”89 The “practical value of the magazine” was self-evident; through
this magazine, graduates could keep their “connection and interests in
these institutions of learning as we go out from them.”90
The emergence of Harvard and Yale’s reviews brought the number of
student-led journals to three. But the Columbia Law Times would not exist
much longer. After ceasing to print class notes in 1891—and thus no
longer being a required purchase for students—it stopped publication in
1893.91 Columbia students would again rise to the editorial challenges
posed by a legal publication. On February 27, 1899, “the more ambitious
students . . . met to organize a society to engage in and promote scientific
legal study and research.”92 Keeping in mind the now successful Harvard
model, these students hoped to stir interest in a legal publication like the
Harvard Law Review.93 At first, they simply sought to create an “informal
voluntary seminar” in order for students to have a setting where they could
“discuss current judicial decisions.”94 During the next few months, the
students selected student officers, honorary members, and a name for their
group (“The Moot”).95 Soon, however, the society faltered, as students
85.
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gained little satisfaction in preparing articles for one another. What they
desired instead was to publish their intellectual travails to the public at
large. With this aim in mind, members of the then-defunct “Moot” set
out to establish a legal publication. From this effort, in 1901, the Columbia
Law Review was born.96
The number of law reviews grew in fits and starts. By 1912, thirty
law journals had begun publication yet only fifteen survived.97 Between
1912 and 1941, sixty-five new law journals were established yet only fortyfive survived.98
During the 1950s, the pendulum began to swing ever so carefully
away from legal pedagogy as a primary academic role and towards a professorial model where scholarship took center stage. As the number of law
reviews grew in dramatic fashion, the professoriat’s emphasis on legal writing grew alongside it.99 Since books about the law were “virtually nonexistent,” professors had a difficult time publishing their work.100 The law
reviews served to fill this vacuum, and the relationship proved to be an
ideal one. Professors needed to publish their work, while “legal articles in a
discipline that did not know the constraints of the refereed journal were in
great demand because of the law reviews’ need to fill up the front part of
their issues with faculty articles.”101 To this day, the relationship seems a
happy one. Not surprisingly, the number of law reviews today has grown
in accordance with the demand.102
B. The Rise of Counterpublics:
Against Equality and Universal Access
From their inception more than a century ago, law reviews have acquired much prestige from within the academic community. They are no
longer little and unappreciated communes within the law schools but the
leading medium through which legal scholarship enters the academic
world. In this vein, its members are considered the up and coming talent
within the law school world. For this reason, it is important to focus attention on how students gain membership to these institutions. It is important to focus attention, that is, on the concept of merit.
96.
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The concept of merit and law reviews arises in two separate instances, when speaking about the institutions themselves and when focusing on the students who staff these institutions. Yet, both instances handle
the question similarly. In general, the reviews have become prestigious institutions, bringing glory and prosperity to their home schools.103 When
looking to the law review within a given school, it is easy to see that the
institution is elite, the cream of the given school’s crop. One reason for this
status is simply the passage of time. Tradition and age both lead to enhanced status. In other words, as one commentator explains, “[b]ecause
they are generally older than the school’s specialty reviews, they have had
more time to accumulate the patina of prestige.”104 This prestige then
plays a self-reinforcing role. As law reviews become more prestigious,
their selectivity increases. The more drafts a review receives for consideration, the more selective it can be, which in turn brings prestige and an
enhanced reputation.105
Perceptions regarding the abilities of review members are similar.
The general perception is one of merit and achievement. Students within
these institutions are considered to be the best and the brightest, the top
students the school has to offer.106 As Frank Kubler writes, “[a]lthough
law review is, in truth, little more than a freshman honor society providing
experience staffing a periodical, it has achieved a status unequaled by any
other honors recognition and unparalleled in any other educational program.”107 This perception follows from structural and substantive understandings of law reviews. Grades and writing ability hold the keys to
admission, which is based on one’s ability to reason and out-perform
103.
See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF
EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 440 (Cornell University Library 2009) (1908) (“Another potent factor in increasing the prosperity of the School arose in th[e] [1887] academic
year, in the founding of the Harvard Law Review, the first legal journal issued in a law school.”).
104.
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Publication Decisions, 39 J. EDUC. 387, 387 (1989).
105.
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36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 5-7 (1986) (“Some years ago, the automatic selection of law-review editors according to their first-year grades was based on the assumption that the best and brightest
could be identified on the basis of academic credentials.”); James Lindgren, Return to Sender, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1722 (1990) (quoting a professor who, while speaking with the editors of
the Texas Law Review, remarked: “You’re supposed to be the cream of the Texas Law School”).
For critiques of this practice, see Frank Kubler, Confusion, Obfuscation, Humiliation, and Hardship:
Is This the Only Way to Learn the Law?, 14 STUDENT LAWYER 10, 11 (Nov. 1985) (“Thus, the
one universally recognized honor in law school is often bestowed, not on the recommendation
of the faculty, but on the questionable judgment of students just finishing their second year.”);
Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In Response to Professor Roger
Crampton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122.
107.
KUBLER, supra note 106, at 11; see also Harold C. Havighurst, Legal Reviews and Legal
Education, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 22, 23 (1956) (“Indeed, the term ‘law review student,’ in that it
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others in intellectual events, or else one’s ability to write well. Either way,
the selectivity of the admissions process, like the selectivity of article selection, reinforces the larger perceptions about the review members and ensures that those selected will be accorded academic honor and prestige.
III. CREATING A RACIAL COUNTERPUBLIC:
THE MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW
As Douglas Kellner has written, an important aim of Structural Transformation was to “delineat[e] a concept of the public sphere which facilitates maximum public participating and debate over the key issues of the
current conjecture and which consequently promotes the cause of participatory democracy.”108 Kellner notes that “Habermas’s focus on democratization was linked with emphasis on political participation as the
core of a democratic society and as an essential element in individual selfdevelopment.”109 The bourgeois public sphere facilitated collective action
by providing a space where individuals could come together to discuss issues of mutual concern. It facilitated democratic participation and selfgovernment by enabling individuals “to organize against arbitrary and oppressive forms of social and political power.”110 More importantly, he
explains,
[f]or the first time in history, individuals and groups could
shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs
and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois
public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion
that opposed state power and the economic interests that were
coming together to shape bourgeois society.111
The bourgeois public sphere facilitated the values of democratic participation, self-government, and autonomy in the face of hegemonic rule. The
public sphere gives voice to the individuals and creates public opinion to
hold the state accountable. It is then in this sense that we believe, with
Nancy Fraser, that something like the bourgeois public sphere, even in its
idealized form, is normatively desirable.
When a group of students came together in the fall of 1994 at the
University of Michigan Law School to start the Michigan Journal of Race and
Law, though they did not articulate their project explicitly in Habermasian
terms, they were coming together to self-consciously form a racial
counterpublic, their own version of a bourgeois public sphere.
108.
Douglas Kellner, Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention, in
PERSPECTIVES ON HABERMAS 259-60 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 2000).
109.
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Like the bourgeois in Habermas’s Structural Transformation, who were
worried about the arbitrary rules imposed upon them by the state and who
sought a voice that would hold the state accountable, these students were
disturbed by their perceived lack of voice at the law school. They were
concerned by the fact that the law school administration was less responsive to the needs of students of color than they were to White students.
They came together to create a journal and in the process to discuss issues
of concern to them at the law school and in the larger society. Not too
dissimilar from the bourgeois in Habermas’s historiography, the students of
color—by students of color we mean to include white students as well as
non-White students—who collectively came together to create the Journal
were seeking a “zone of mediation” between themselves and the law
school administration.
Further, like Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere, the Journal served
as a public sphere—more precisely a counterpublic sphere—that mediated
between the students and the law school administration. The founding
members of MJRL thought that they could get the law school administration to be more responsive to their needs by starting the Journal. The justification for this hope was twofold. First, starting the Journal involved
collective action by the students and also involved convincing the administration to provide some modicum of support for the enterprise. Establishing the Journal was proof that a group of otherwise marginalized students
could collectively organize and make demands upon the law school’s leadership structure.
Second, our observation was that the faculty and the administration
paid a great deal of attention to the needs and views of students who were
on journals, particularly the flagship Law Review. These students were
often offered the best resources that the Law School had to dispense: research assistantships, clerkships, awards, and the like. Of course, the implicit reason for dispensing these resources was merit. These students were
viewed as deserving because they distinguished themselves academically.
Moreover, because this public sphere was ostensibly open and accessible to
all, its outputs were also ei ipso legitimate.
But our suspicion was that not all students were afforded the same
opportunity to distinguish themselves academically. Counterpublics often
arise because public spheres are not open and accessible to all. Besides,
even if some students of color were let in, they could not expect participatory parity within the public sphere. One reason for starting an academic journal was to provide a space for students of color to distinguish
themselves academically, to engage in an academic enterprise that was valued by the institution. Our hope was that we could leverage that value into
influence and improve the lot and standing of students of color at the Law
School.
As we note above, MJRL was a counterpublic. There are at least
three insights that follow from viewing law reviews as public spheres and
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journals such as MJRL as counterpublics. First, we can better appreciate
how public spheres are not open and accessible to all and why counterpublics are necessary to assure participatory equality. The Journal was created
against the backdrop of another institutional hegemon and what passed as
the public sphere in that context, the flagship law review, which many
students of color viewed as exclusive and unwelcoming.
More pointedly, the racial exclusivity that we perceived in the flagship law review was essential to the status of the law journal. That is, racial
exclusivity was tied to the merit of the flagship law review; the fact that
there were few people of color on the flagship law review was a testament
to its merit. Racial exclusivity was a mark of “distinction.”112 Importantly,
racial exclusivity does not simply mean the corporal exclusion of people of
color but also the racial exclusion or minimization of racial issues and racial
viewpoints that mattered to communities of color. The result was, to paraphrase Fraser, a racialized conception of merit and deservedness that
“functioned to legitimate an emergent form of racial rule.”113 Within this
context it is easy to conclude that merit is the rule of the best.114 And
those who are part of the public sphere are the best. Missing is an account
of the “ways in which social inequalities can infect deliberation [and participation], even in the absence of any formal exclusions.”115
Second, the public sphere offers the opportunity for self-rule and is
transformative. The availability of counterpublics makes available the possibility of self-rule and transformation through discursive interaction. The
flagship law review as a public sphere is important not simply for what it
signifies internally, but also because it helps its participants to develop their
individual (as well as collective) capacities and their roles in the larger society. The public sphere is constitutive and transformative; its participants
learn to understand themselves by participating in it. To use a grammatically awkward phrase, participants in the public sphere become who they
will become by participating in the public sphere. Fraser describes the
bourgeois public sphere as “the arena, the training ground, and eventually
the power base of a status of bourgeois men, who were coming to see
themselves as a ‘universal class’ and preparing to assert their fitness to govern.”116 The public sphere enables its participants to learn how to use their
reason, make persuasive arguments, and engage the power structure. It is
where participants practice self-rule and become the leaders that they ex112.
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pect to be in society at large. This is what we mean by the observation that
the public sphere is constitutive.
Law reviews as public spheres are training grounds for future leaders
of the profession. They are important sites for the practice of self-government. Their importance as training grounds for leadership and self-government are so well recognized that membership in a law review is often
required for entry into the profession’s most prestigious jobs such as clerkships, private law firms, government jobs, and academia. Members of a law
review develop a sense of themselves as leaders and mediators of power,
and they use the law review as preparation “to assert their fitness to govern.”117 Law review members develop a self-identity as editors-in-chief,
article editors, managing editors, and as students whose positions on the
law review minimize the power imbalance that ordinarily exists between
students and faculty. Students then take that self-identity to the next rung
on the legal employment ladder, clerkships, high-status law firms, prestigious government positions, legal academia, and the like. Fraser puts the
point best, noting that flagship law reviews as public spheres “are arenas for
the formation and enactment of social identities.”118
Finally, like the public sphere, the flagship law review lays claim to
truth, objectivity, normativity, and neutrality. It only publishes the best
articles. It only selects the best editors. The substantive topics that it publishes are the most important and significant ones. Its selection processes—
articles and editors—are based purely upon merit.
The flagship law reviews are often referred to as the general interest
law reviews. General interest is framed in contradistinction to specialty interest law reviews. Recall here the claim by Habermas that the public
sphere is to deliberate about “public matters.” In this context, general interest means of concern to all. Again, this must be seen as in contradistinction to the special interest law reviews, which are of concern to a narrow
set of people, such that one might even call these private interests. On that
basis, one can then privilege the journals that foster deliberation on matters
of general interest and marginalize the specialty or private interest journals.
Notice how marginalization of issues is related to the marginalization
of persons. How does the public sphere determine which issues are matters
of public concern? The public sphere makes this determination through
the public reasoning of its participants and through discursive engagement.
Participants in the public sphere get to privilege their views of what matters to all and what ought to be viewed as private or specialized interest.
Because the public sphere claims to be open to all and because it is based
upon reason without regard to status, the public opinion generated by the
117.
Fraser, supra note 9, at 60.
118.
Id. at 16. Fraser goes on to note: “This means that participation is not simply a matter
of being able to state propositional contents that are neutral with respect to form of expression.
Rather, . . . participation means being able to speak ‘in one’s own voice,’ thereby simultaneously
constructing and expressing one’s cultural identity through idiom and style.” Id.
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public sphere could be regarded as objective and the product of reason.
However, because the public sphere is truly not open and available to all,
the public square simply privileges some persons (and their views) over
other persons (and their views).
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as we agree that something like the Habermasian public
sphere is normatively desirable—largely because of the necessity of deliberative space that facilitates the collective deliberation about matters of
mutual concern, including a collective assessment of the performance of
the state or power structure—it also follows that counterpublics are equally
normatively desirable. In societies with groups that have multiple identities, no single discursive space can function as the public sphere. Moreover,
“in stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate contestation
among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public.”119
One must be universally skeptical about claims to openness and equal
accessibility. Given differentials among individuals and groups, a claim that
an overarching public is equally accessible and open to all notwithstanding
existing social categories carries an extremely high epistemic burden. Further, given existing social inequalities and how social inequalities interact
with opportunity to the benefit of those with higher status as against those
with lower status, the epistemic burden of the claim to open access is effectively insurmountable.
When a group of students came together to create the Michigan Journal of Race and Law, it was clear that the claim that the flagship law review
was open to all who merited entry was demonstrably false. Access reflected
existing social inequality and status. In particular, students of color were
less likely to gain access, though in our view, they carried no less merit.
One reason for MJRL was to lay claim to the point that talent was not
truly open to merit. The flagship law review was not flagship but simply
one among many public spheres, though it happened to be the earliest
public sphere.
As importantly, MJRL was an exercise in self-government and selftransformation. MJRL, like other counterpublics, enabled its participants
to form a “parallel discursive area[ ] where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscources, which in turn permit
them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests,
and needs.”120 Counterpublics can offer different ideas about self-government and self-transformation. They can offer different meanings of leader119.
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ship and train a different group of people for governance in the larger
society.121
Finally, counterpublics redefine what is public and what is private,
who counts and who does not. For those of us who founded the Journal,
issues of race were issues of public concern and not specialized or private
interests. We thought that scholars who wrote about race were engaged in
important scholarship and deserved to be hired by the best institutions,
provided that they were not being disqualified simply because they wrote
about race. The Journal was and perhaps still is a claim about who matters
and what matters. The Journal made legible the ways in which claims to
openness, universal access, reason, and merit replicate existing inequalities.

121.
Id. at 124 (“The point is that, in stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics have a
dual character. On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the
other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed
toward wider publics.”).

